THE SCIENCE OF CRITICISM IN INDIA

DR. A. K. WARDER
Professor of Sanskrit, University of Toronto

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To

Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja

rājan yathājñāpayasi:

śreyāṃsi vivṛtadvārāṇy adya vidyāḥ svayaṃvarāḥ |
siddhayaḥ kāmacāriṇyas tvadājñāṃ ko 'tivartate ||

(Kṣemīśvara)

PREFACE

India has a vast, though little known, literature. Even in India itself few people have any idea of the extent and interest of this heritage, being mostly intent on material affairs and on foreign ideas which might prove financially advantageous. They may be dimly aware that there is a considerable religious literature, some old epics of a semi-religious character, a few books of philosophy and a sprinkling of modern novels. It is a rare thing to meet a person who knows anything of the long tradition of literature in the strict sense of poetic and dramatic works and of fiction. Outside India, again, everyone has heard something of the great religious tradition of Brahmanism and Buddhism, but few have stumbled upon a work of literary art from India, a work whose main purpose is to entertain and not to teach.

This small volume is not intended to indicate the extent of India's little known literature but, instead, to discuss the enjoyment of it. Some might think such discussion superfluous: one may simply read, at least in translations (though India has been poorly served by translators, compared, for example, with China), and if one enjoys the story, or the characterizations and

descriptions, well and good; if not, one may try something else. But literature does not always yield its pleasures so easily, especially when it belongs to an unfamiliar tradition or to a past epoch. Remoteness always brings a special charm and a safe detachment, but it may result in difficulty of perception unless some aid is provided. It is part of the purpose of the present sketch to indicate the value and interest of literary criticism itself, particularly when objective and scientific, regardless of any special problem of remoteness in time or in culture. The critics whose works we are to discuss were not at all remote in culture from the literature they studied, but belonged to the Indian tradition itself; they were also not far removed in time from their subject, though far enough to be objective in their appreciation of the authors they wrote about.

Thus our study is not directly of the beauties of Indian literature but of the appreciations of Indian literary criticism. Ultimately, however, our objective is the same: it is the enjoyment of literature.

This volume originated as a series of six lectures given in the University of Madras in 1977. It is a pleasure to thank Dr. K. K. Raja, Professor of Sanskrit, for his kind invitation and participation and interesting comments. Since the lectures, though public, were intended primarily for students, they have been revised here in an effort to make them more accessible to a wider readership. However, criticism is a somewhat technical subject, and it has seemed better to retain this technicality, though attempting to explain

it clearly, than to water it down or even wash it out altogether in the hope of being easy and popular. For the same reason, references to the original sources and the necessary bibliography are supplied.

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THE SCIENCE OF CRITICISM IN INDIA

I

SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Although, according to the *Nāṭyaśāstra* ('Treatise on Drama', the earliest full-fledged work of criticism extant) and the later critics, literature may be instructive, it must always be enjoyable. It is the fact that literature gives pleasure or delight which is its essential characteristic, any instructiveness is merely incidental and unessential. If the function of literature were instead to teach, then it would be assimilated to learned treatises (*śāstra-s*), and it would be better to read a work on law and conduct, such as the *Mānavadharmaśāstra*, than an epic poem such as Kālidāsa's *Raghuvaṃśa*, or the Vedic *Brāhmaṇa-s* rather than Bhavabhūti's play, *Uttararāmacarita*. This principle has to be stressed, because under the influence of the 19th century utilitarians, who seem still to be the official philosophers of India, not to mention Victorian and missionary puritanism, intolerance and anti-secularism, many scholars in our field still adopt an apologetic attitude of seeking to justify the reading of literature only for what moral instruction or religious teaching may be reflected in it. Kālidāsa has been presented as an insufferable

moraliser and Vālmīki as a tedious theologian. But the true function of literature, as all the old critics agree, is to entertain, to give joy. As Śyāmilaka has said (*Pādatāḍitaka*, verse 5):

> Ascetics do not attain release by weeping,
> humorous stories do not obstruct a future heaven;
> Therefore a wise man should laugh with an appreciative mind
> after abandoning mean modes of life.

This is the starting point of aesthetic theory and of all literary criticism.

In order to enjoy a literature fully we must try to approach it from the standpoint of the tradition which produced it, not from some other tradition. This should be obvious, yet it has to be said here because in recent years an alien and even hostile approach to Indian literature has widely prevailed. European late Romanticism, still commonly adopted in books on the subject as the only possible approach (without any discussion), is totally foreign to Indian literature except for a few recent imitations of European models. Indeed it is also alien to the European classics and has now been generally superseded in the West itself by new theories. It is high time to revive Indian aesthetics and criticism, so that we can enjoy Indian literature as it was meant to be enjoyed.

It has been suggested by a contemporary Western critic (Professor N. Frye) that literary criticism should

be a 'science'.[1] Criticism, he says, is to literature as physics is to nature. Students can learn physics and they can learn criticism, they cannot learn nature or literature (in the strict sense of learning concepts and principles, not just collecting unorganized materials). Though this view may seem extreme and contentious, at first, there is much to be said for it, particularly in relation to Indian criticism (though Frye seems to be unaware of the existence of Indian criticism). We may note that the idea of literature, or of the 'arts' or 'humanities', as unscientific subjects, is peculiar to the English academic tradition and those derived from it (including of course the 'modern' Indian educational system). This obviously is why Frye found the need to combat it. It is foreign to the general European academic tradition in France, Germany, Russia, etc., where all subjects are regarded as 'sciences'. Admittedly intuitionist and subjectivist approaches have sometimes been advocated in Germany and elsewhere, though in the name of science, but it is in the English tradition that literature and the other humanities have long been proclaimed unscientific as a matter of high principle. It is urged that they are non-quantitative, non-analytic, irrational, subjective, emotional, spiritual or unsystematic and that they deal with abstract 'values' inaccessible to scientific analysis and incapable of clear description. It is of course a misconception of the nature of science that it reduces

[1] pp. 7ff., 11.

all things to a mean and worldly level: is there a higher ideal than the pursuit of truth? But let us not embark on a defence of science. Our objection to intuitive and subjectivist criticism is that it leads to dogmatic assertions rather than discussion and that the student is expected to accept it and memorize it uncritically. Here we have the further objection that Indian literary criticism is of a different character, as we shall now try to clarify.

As a science, Frye maintains, literary criticism should have principles which make it general and comprehensive, instead of subjective (and ephemeral, we may add, a matter of changing fashions). It should be 'progressive' in the sense of cumulative; i.e. its principles are developed, corrected, added to, as in other sciences, by successive critics. It should have definitions, beginning with a definition of 'literature' itself, which Frye found lacking in Western criticism (the English language has no word for 'literature' in the precise sense of literature as an art).

Now in Indian criticism we find precisely these things, beginning with a word for its subject matter, namely *kāvya*, which means precisely literature as an art, including drama, poetry and fiction. The definition of *kāvya* has progressed through many centuries of attempts to improve on Bhāmaha's (4th or 5th century) brief *śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam* (I. 16), '*kāvya* is expression and meaning combined', which, however, is further qualified by the statement that both are endowed with *alaṃkāra* or beauty, the latter itself further defined as

vakra, 'curved' or 'figurative' (I. 36). Then the divisions of literature have been defined (corresponding in a very general sense to a theory of genres) and the various figures of speech, qualities of style and other identifiable characteristics of *kāvya*. Above all, there is the aesthetic theory of *rasa* concerning the enjoyment of drama or literature by an audience or readers, which was extended from the theatre to all literature and then to the other arts. Dependent on this is the analysis of dramatic plots, which again was generalized to apply to all literature (even a single lyric verse could be seen as having a plot, a movement or conflict, within its scope). The requirement that criticism should be a science seems thus to be satisfied by Indian criticism, as we shall see in more detail later. One might add that this was a very natural development in India, since from the outset literary criticism there, was closely associated with linguistics, itself a science from at least the time of Pāṇini (4th century B.C.) and probably much earlier. Literary criticism in India may be regarded as an extension of the scientific study of language into the field of the special use of language as a medium of art.

In connection with criticism being a science we may add a further characteristic of sciences, barely touched on by Frye. Criticism and its theories should follow the investigation of literature by the critic. Literature does not follow theories, as a general rule, but precedes them, though once theories are propounded later authors may be influenced by them (but this might be regarded as ultimately following the model of an

earlier author from whose work the theory was deduced). In other words, criticism should be an empirical science, following from the investigation and analysis of literature, describing this, finding out why it is enjoyed or regarded as 'beautiful' and then formulating general principles. In India the main tradition is empiricist, though some relatively recent writers have to some extent deviated from this approach and tried to set up abstract or ideal systems (inventing their own examples accordingly). We shall see below how the critics worked from the literature, and from the experience of those who enjoyed it, in establishing their principles.

The discipline of literary criticism overlaps with that of textual criticism. Everything we do in this field is based on texts. It is therefore essential to know, when using any book (or manuscript), what the text contained in it is. It is absurd (which does not mean that it has not been done) to discuss an author's style and vocabulary on the basis of a corrupt text containing things he did not write. The literary critic, consequently, must be on his guard against false texts, must be acquainted with the principles of textual criticism so that he can distinguish between a reliable text and a corrupt, apocryphal or doubtful one. Most people seem to have a blind faith in printed books and to assume that, if a title page states that a book contains a certain text, then that is the absolute and final text and there is no need to investigate its credentials. But even a text obtained from an apparently reliable source may turn out, on collation with other texts of the same work, to be

corrupt, though the corruptions may be of respectable antiquity and may have been honoured with learned comment. This is especially true of more popular works, which have received wide circulation and been frequently copied (or, in recent years, printed, which is the same thing). Of course, it is precisely in the case of widely circulated works that textual criticism can be very effective, because there may be plenty of materials available, from different places and independently handed down, through which interpolations can be spotted by collation. Nevertheless it can be shown that less popular works, their manuscripts rarely touched and copied at long intervals, have sometimes come down to us in very authentic texts.

If one compares different editions of familiar classics, for example the *Meghasaṃdeśa* or the *Veṇīsaṃhāra* or the *Mudrārākṣasa*, one finds very great discrepancies in their texts. There are many *Meghasaṃdeśa-s* (or *Meghadūta-s*, the title itself varies), with different numbers of verses and different readings within the verses. The various commentators, whom one might regard as authorities on the correct readings of the text, are found to diverge widely. The 'standard' commentator Mallinātha (15th century), whose reputation is assured by his dexterous command of Sanskrit grammar, follows a very corrupt text and accepts at least twenty verses which textual criticism demonstrates cannot have been composed by Kālidāsa. We can show this by collating texts of the *Meghasaṃdeśa* preserved in places as distant from one another as

Kaśmīra (with the commentary of Vallabhadeva, 10th century) and Kerala (with the commentary of Pūrṇasarasvatī, 14th century). These agree and thus must contain a very old form of the text, except that Vallabhadeva has one extra verse; neither has the many additional verses which have got into the text of Mallinātha (in Andhra).

The explanation for such discrepancies is firstly that over the centuries, as a text is repeatedly copied by scribes, numerous mistakes are made (it is humanly impossible to make an exact copy of a text of any length, even the best scribe will make a few mistakes). Usually someone will try to correct the text after it has been copied and obvious slips will be eliminated. Fairly often, however, the would-be corrector only makes another mistake, the difference being that his mistaken correction makes some kind of sense, instead of no sense, and consequently is hard to detect later. The reader or critic of course wants to have what the original author wrote, not the ingenious restoration of some paṇḍit. Such restorations commonly substitute some commonplace idea or cliché, where the original had something fresh and unexpected: the implications for literary appreciation are obvious. Secondly quite new passages, especially verses, get inserted in a work, particularly if it is a popular work often read by the owner of a manuscript. This can happen when a reader notes in the margin of his copy a verse containing something similar to a passage in the text, as it were expanding or commenting on a description. It may

be a verse of the reader's own composition, feeling inspired to emulate Kālidāsa or some other classical author. Eventually the manuscript becomes old and a scribe may be employed to make a fresh copy of it. Usually a scribe will copy into the text any marginal notes or additions, taking them to be corrections to the previous copy, including verses carelessly left out by the previous scribe. Thenceforth they appear to be part of the text and can be detected only by collation with other manuscripts, of course 'independent' manuscripts belonging to another line of transmission of the text. If such independent manuscripts cannot be found, there will generally be no way of proving that any part of the text is not authentic.

An edition of a text, which uses all the extant manuscript material and collates it as very roughly indicated above, in order to establish as far as possible what the original author wrote, is known as a 'critical' edition. This term unfortunately is often misused, especially by those who do not understand it, and may be a trap for the unwary. Sometimes the editor of the text simply does not know what 'critical' means, in this technical sense. Textual criticism is not a matter of simple common sense or of picking out 'good' readings (which generally means subjective choice). Its principles, such as the methods of determining the relationships among the manuscripts available, are not at all obvious and it may be difficult to get even otherwise excellent scholars to understand them or to realize that more than a knowledge of the language

of the text is needed. Very often an editor does not bother to place his evidence before his readers, in the form of a 'critical apparatus' giving the readings of the manuscripts, so that one cannot see how the text has been arrived at and can only fear the worst (arbitrary subjective selections). Critical editing is laborious work and editors are liable to be lazy; in certain cases they may be little better than frauds, or an unscrupulous publisher may call the work 'critical' so that libraries will buy it. For whatever reasons, critical editions of *kāvya-s* are rare and students of literature have to be aware of this fact if they are to avoid wasting their time on false texts. Thus for example we have no critical editions of the works of Kālidāsa, contrary to the claims of certain publishers and editors.

In literary criticism we shall be concerned with quotations from literature by critics. These quotations often differ considerably from the texts as available to us, so that we are at once in the realm of textual criticism, in effect with two manuscripts to be collated. An important contribution to textual criticism from the testimony of critics is the elimination of apocryphal additions to the works of a popular author. The critics quote profusely from cantos I-VIII of Kālidāsa's *Kumārasaṃbhava*, for example. In striking contrast, they do not quote at all from the continuation of the poem which is sometimes added and which a few scholars persist in regarding as authentic Kālidāsa. As Hari Chand argues in his thesis, this evidence is quite decisive in showing that Kālidāsa wrote only

eight cantos. Such commentators as Mallinātha, moreover, wrote on only these eight cantos, which is further corroboration of the same point. Obviously this apocryphal supplement is of quite recent origin (16th century or later: a critical editor of the poem would be able to determine the time and probably the place of its composition, from the distribution of manuscripts).

Textual criticism leads us to the more general question of bibliography. It may seem a trivial remark that one cannot study literary criticism without being in command of the writings of the critics and of the literature they wrote on. But unfortunately in our field there are tremendous obstacles to this. No library in the world has a collection adequate for the study of Indian literary criticism. There are several reasons for this. One is that several important works remain unprinted, for example the second half of Kuntaka's *Vakroktijīvita*, Bahurūpamiśra's commentary on the *Daśarūpaka* and the anonymous *Naṭāṅkuśa*. Manuscripts of these are available only in two or three public libraries in India and one has to obtain transscripts of them (which is not always easy) in order to have access to their contents. These are only conspicuously important works in a mass of unprinted material. But then, as indicated above, even the printed editions of texts are in many cases unsatisfactory, so that again recourse should be had to manuscripts. The attention of students should be drawn to this state of affairs, so that they may know the

conditions under which they are working (and not make false assumptions about our knowledge of the subject) and also see that there is much interesting research for them to carry out. Another reason is that the acquisition programmes of almost all libraries are inadequate, generally through lack of funds and low priority for our subject but all too frequently through lack of cooperation between librarians, jealous of their professional privileges, and the research scholars whose needs it is their duty to serve. As a result, most libraries have serious gaps in their collections of printed books in the field of Indian literature and criticism. It should be added that the printing of Sanskrit texts has been extraordinarily scattered, especially in India itself, making it very difficult even for experts in the field to find out everything that is available. In this situation some scholars adopt the attitude of the frog in the well, contenting themselves with a few well worn classics. The effect of this, however, is that they have little of interest to say even about these few classics, since they cannot see them in the context of related works.

II

AESTHETICS

The enjoyment of literature has many aspects and has been explained in various ways by the Indian critics, using such terms as words meaning 'joy' or 'delight' (*harṣa* in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, *prīti* in Bhāmaha and so on) and 'diversion' *vinoda*, 'solace' *viśrāma* (both in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*) and other related ideas. But the essential thing in this enjoyment, its essence, according to the entire Indian tradition, is what is called *rasa* (*Nāṭyaśāstra* VI, prose after verse 31, is the starting point for us). Judging from some of the discussions about *rasa*, one would conclude that it is a mysterious concept and that no one really knows what it means. Now there are different theories about *rasa*, philosophical theories, some of which are difficult to understand. But there ought not to be any mystery about what *rasa* means. The original meaning of the word is 'taste' and the *Nāṭyaśāstra* explains it as 'taste', on the analogy of tasting food. We can in fact keep the English word 'taste' as a translation of *rasa* without serious distortion or confusion. Two things should be borne in mind here. Firstly, in English aesthetics 'taste', a word which is used for the sense of taste as well as for its object, has been used as

referring to judgment rather than enjoyment or variety of experience. Secondly, in aesthetics the word *rasa* is of course used in a metaphorical sense. We cannot 'taste' a *kāvya* by eating it, or 'taste' a play in the theatre as an object *rasa* of our sense of taste. Obviously this primary meaning is excluded. The reason for adopting this particular metaphor appears to be the following: in the theatre (where the term *rasa* was first adopted for aesthetic discussions) the audience see the actors and the play and also hear them. If one spoke of having a sight of the play, or hearing its sound, this would not express the appreciation of it as drama, as the invisible play of emotions behind the visible movements and the speeches expressing its effects. By speaking instead of 'taste', something further is indicated, and what seems to be meant from the beginning is precisely this dramatic appreciation. The word 'taste' belongs to the realm of sense perception, in other words, to 'aesthetics' in its more general sense. It is used here to refer to the perception of drama, or by extension, of literature and art in general, and indicates how the audience or readers are thought to perceive the content of these. A fairly precise equivalent for *rasa* is therefore 'aesthetic experience'.

We may thus describe the *rasa* concept as a concept, or a theory, of perception, in the special sense of aesthetic perception (in its particular sense of the appreciation of art). From the *Nāṭyaśāstra*'s account of the method used by actors to produce *rasa* in an audience, we see that the object of this perception is the *bhāva-s*,

the states of mind or emotions, of the characters in the play as they participate in its action. These emotions are for the most part invisible and are understood to be present only through the representation by the actors of their causes and effects (respectively *vibhāva-s* and *anubhāva-s* in the terminology of the theatre), supplemented by subsidiary or transient emotions (*vyabhicāribhāva-s*) as side effects of the main emotions (*sthāyibhāva-s*). In fact, of course, these emotions, though aesthetically 'perceived', are not present at all on the stage. The actors are not experiencing them but acting them. The characters represented are present only in the imagination of the audience and it is the imagined emotions of these characters which are the object of aesthetic perception.

It was this indirectness and the element of imagination which led Śaṅkuka and others to the opinion that the aesthetic experience is not a matter of perception but of inference: we infer the emotions of the characters from perceiving their effects represented (Śaṅkuka's work is not now available, but his ideas are discussed by Abhinavagupta in his *Abhinavabhāratī*, vol. I, pp. 272-3 and 284). However, Abhinavagupta replies to this that the aesthetic experience is immediate, not indirect. Thus it is not ordinary perception, but it is a kind of perception produced by art. It is not perception as in everyday life; it is detached, pure, not involved, does not arouse our everyday concerns but takes us away from them. It is universal or completely objective, not particular or subjective. Thus it does not

arouse the emotions of the audience but is a detached perception of the emotions of others (Abhinavagupta, vol. I, pp. 36, 278 ff). The contrast between an emotional reaction and an aesthetic reaction to a play is illustrated very clearly in the scene of a play within a play in Kṣemīśvara's *Naiṣadhānanda*, Act VI. Nala, incognito, is sitting with Ṛtuparṇa in the audience seeing a play about the terrible experiences of Damayantī, his wife. Ṛtuparṇa has an aesthetic experience, but Nala instead reacts emotionally, though Ṛtuparṇa keeps reminding him that it is a play and is puzzled at his strange excitement.

According to the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (I), the drama represents everything in life, but all is presented through the emotions of human beings, through the emotional reactions of characters experiencing life. Even nature is presented through its effects on human emotions and as an active cause of emotions through the continual changes of the seasons. Alternatively, in lyric poetry natural phenomena may be personified, in other words imagined to experience human emotions themselves. In this connection we may observe that the possibilities for the appreciation of nature through poetry, which might appear somewhat limited in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* method of presentation, have been extended in the theories of some of the later critics. Thus Bhoja indicates that when enjoying a landscape described in poetry we may have the *preyas*, the 'affectionate' aesthetic experience (the *preyas* as *rasa* seems to have been introduced into the theory by Rudraṭa in the

ninth century, XIII. 3 and XV. 17 ff. of his work). Bhoja (*Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, vol. II, p. 560) gives an example of this from Bhavabhūti:

> These are the Southern Mountains, their
> highest blue peaks supported by clouds,
> with the gurgling roaring of the waters of the
> Godāvarī in their caverns;
> These are the sacred confluences of rivers with
> deep waters, wild
> with the clamourings of turbulent waves
> confused by repulsing one another.
>
> *Uttararāmacarita*, II. 30

According to Bhoja the 'affection', *prīti*, here has particular reference to the sounds described (to Rāma in the play, who would be imagined by the audience to hear them).

It might be regarded as a different kind of extension of this aesthetic theory when critics say that we may admire the technical skill of an author in using words and have *camatkāra*, 'admiration'; this could perhaps be regarded as included in the 'marvellous' *adbhuta* aesthetic experience, which arises in relation to something astonishing.

Of the eight original *rasa*-s of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, *śṛṅgāra*, which arises from the perception of love, *rati*, stands first. There seems to be no English equivalent for *śṛṅgāra*, a fact which is not surprising in the case of a technical term in a theory unique to India. The commonly used stop-gap 'erotic' ought to be avoided

as completely misleading. It is a fact that in Indian literature as in most literatures the theme of love is extremely popular. The use of the term 'erotic' to describe the effect of any story of love, however, seems to have given rise to the absurd view that almost all Sanskrit literature is pornographic, a view shared by puritans of various religious traditions who are afraid to read it or allow others to read it, and by the old school of imperialists who maintained that the inhabitants of India were a decadent lot interested only in sex and therefore fit only to be slaves. The whole point of art, however, and the point made by the *rasa* theory, is that it gives an aesthetic pleasure, a mental experience which detaches one from personal concerns. The *śṛṅgāra* experience, therefore, of an audience seeing Bhavabhūti's *Uttararāmacarita*, or of a reader of Amaruka, is not the emotion of love felt towards the hero or the heroine. It may be a feeling of delight in relation to the happiness of the characters imagined, but it is an act of detached contemplation, joyful for the very reason that the spectator is completely free. Having in view only this aesthetic response to the loves of others, this unselfish, impersonal and free delight in the emotions of lovers presented in literature, we may provisionally use the term 'sensitive' to represent *śṛṅgāra*, hoping that some better equivalent will eventually be found.

The other seven *rasa-s* appear to show some variation in their relationships to the emotions which give rise to them. Thus the contemplation of grief

gives rise to the compassionate, *karuṇa*, evidently related to compassion, *karuṇā*, in real life or in Buddhist philosophy, yet still detached. Energy, *utsāha*, or courage produces the heroic, *vīra*, experience, as in Abhinanda's description (*Rāmacarita* XV. 64) of Hanumant about to leap over the ocean:

> The Sun has been circled by his tail, the
> Moon has been pierced by his crest,
> the clouds have been tossed by his mane, the
> stars have been attacked by his teeth,
> He has crossed the ocean just with a glance,
> with its bright loud-laughing waves,
> he has traversed in all directions the cruel
> fire of the glory of the Lord of Laṅkā.

Vidyākara (1552) quotes this to illustrate the heroic *rasa*. The effect is heightened by the fact that Hanumant has not yet begun his great leap or flight: the intention expressed by his glance is enough and for the reader Rāvaṇa's glory is already as good as eclipsed. The exaggerations of the narrator are suited to this *rasa*, whilst they would be quite inappropriate in the hero himself, who is aware simply of his energy and his determination to serve Rāma (XV. 67).

The comic again is different in that it may seem to occur in everyday life, if not in its pure aesthetic state (it may be contaminated with malice and worldly interests in real life). It might be regarded, when sufficiently pure, as a kind of intrusion of aesthetic experience into everyday life, leading to a refreshing,

though momentary, detachment from our usual worries. Dāmodaragupta in his *Kuṭṭanīmata* has presented a group of harlots discussing their work, with a good deal of humour mixed with complaints and sarcasm and perhaps a touch of malice. We assume they enjoy the humour and the comic spectacles portrayed by the speakers, whilst for the reader the comic is purified of any worldly concerns:

> A stupid young brahman, not clever, cruel in his exertions, for whom a woman is a rare thing,
> Set about me in the night: sudden death pretending to be a lover! (392)
>
> Listen, friend, to the curious thing done today by a rustic lover;
> When I closed my eyes in the enjoyment of lovemaking, he said: 'She's dead!' and, frightened, let me go! (398)

These are quoted for the comic experience by Jalhaṇa (p. 311) and Vallabhadeva (2339 and 2338) and the second also by Śārṅgadhara (4058).

The emotions may of course be mixed, as is indicated by the mention of subsidiary emotions in the *Nāṭyaśāstra's* statement of the method of producing *rasa* referred to above: 'The aesthetic experience arises from the conjunction of the causes of the emotion, the effects of the emotion and the subsidiary emotions'. Indeed the general impression from the critics is that the effect is best when various emotions are mixed and that a

kāvya is better if many emotions and aesthetic experiences are touched on. But it is also generally agreed that one emotion and one *rasa* should predominate. Such mixture may be illustrated from Bhavabhūti's play *Mālatīmādhava* and even from a single verse in it:

> Snatching my beloved out of range of the
> knife blow of this brigand, through fate,
> obtaining her face grazed, like the crescent
> Moon by Rāhu;
> How does my heart endure, weak with terror,
> melting with compassion,
> shaken with astonishment, blazing with anger,
> opening with joy? (V. 28)

Here we have a series of conflicting emotions, as Bhoja (*Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa*, pp. 574-5) and others have pointed out, which even suggest a series of *rasa-s* (the furious in relation to the violence of the brigand or Rāhu, the marvellous in relation to obtaining Mālatī unexpectedly, the apprehensive and the compassionate). But the commentator Pūrṇasarasvatī here maintains that only their transient emotions occur (anger, astonishment, fear and grief as subsidiary transients, not as main emotions), subordinate to love as the main emotion producing the sensitive aesthetic experience. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* already indicates that the main emotions may be subordinated to one another as subsidiaries (prose after VI. 45). The causes of the emotion are Mālatī and seeing the situation she is in. The effects of the emotion are Mādhava's reactions in mind and

speech expressed here and the appropriate bodily movements which the actor will make. This acting should show trembling, tears, paralysis, change of colour, horripilation and so on as 'expressive' *sāttvika* emotions (a subdivision of the subsidiary emotions which are shown directly), as well as the other subsidiary emotions—bewilderment, despair, doubt, ferocity and contentment. To these remarks by Pūrṇasarasvatī, Bhoja adds still other points about the dramatic technique, such as the 'violent' *ārabhaṭī* mode, *vṛtti*, of stage business (*Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa*, p. 740). He quotes the verse again as a general illustration for the production of aesthetic experience from the causes and effects of emotions and the subsidiary emotions (*Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, vol. II, pp. 445-6).

The *Nāṭyaśāstra* has little to say of aesthetics as a theory; it is practical and sets out a method which, presumably, produced satisfactory results in the theatre, i.e. the audience enjoyed plays so performed. The later philosophers of aesthetics tried in various ways to explain the facts of *rasa*. One old theory which was widely followed was that the *rasa* was a kind of 'increase' of the main emotion. Apparently this meant a qualitative change, when the *sthāyibhāva* imagined in the character increased to such a level that it became tastable, a taste, *rasa*. It seems unlikely that this was the original conception, since the *Nāṭyaśāstra* keeps the concepts of *bhāva* and *rasa* quite distinct and with a causal relation between them, *bhāva* producing *rasa*. It is only in the sense that it is the *bhāva-s* that are

tasted, or acquire taste-ness, that the text may appear to suggest that a *bhāva* in some sense becomes a *rasa* when developed through its causes and effects. This may be understood as a figurative, metaphorical expression or as equivalent to saying that the *bhāva*, the emotion, becomes beautiful. The theory of 'increase' is known to have been held with variations by Daṇḍin (II. 279) in the seventh century and then by Udbhaṭa (p. 52) and Lollaṭa (see *Abhinavabhāratī*, vol. I, p. 272).

Śaṅkuka in the ninth century saw a process of inference instead of perception, as already noted, when the actor imitates experiencing the main emotion and the audience infer its presence from its causes and effects. The actual emotion of course is not present, but according to Śaṅkuka its imitation, which is present (through the inference), is called *rasa*, the taste. Mahimabhaṭṭa in the eleventh century followed a similar theory of inference. Śaṅkuka criticized Lollaṭa's theory on the ground that it does not explain the essential difference between the taste *rasa* and the emotion *bhāva*, to say that it is simply a matter of degrees of intensity. Bhaṭṭanāyaka (see *Abhinavabhāratī*, vol. I, pp. 276-7) then objected that Śaṅkuka's theory did not explain why *rasa* was enjoyable, nor that it was not like individual experience but was a generalized experience. The audience did not have unpleasent experiences when the emotions of the characters were unpleasant, they always experienced enjoyment. The contemplation of the audience was a kind of meditation, becoming

free from individual existence and ignorance and attaining the highest joy.

The theory of Abhinavagupta (beginning of the eleventh century), which has been most widely accepted, is based on that of Nāyaka, but stresses the point of universalization or transcendence of particularity rather than that of the joy of the audience. Aesthetic experience is non-individual and transcends space, time and particular circumstances. The individual forgets himself and thereby attains the highest happiness. The essence of *rasa* is that it is tasted, does not go beyond tasting (*Abhinavabhāratī*, vol. I, p. 284), it is not the experience of the corresponding emotion. The development of aesthetic theory successively by Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta may be noted as a good example of literary criticism being 'progressive'.

There are other theories about *rasa* which need not be taken up here. An important problem which should at least be mentioned is whether *rasa* is ultimately one or many or whether one of the *rasa-s* is the most important or ultimately absorbs the others into itself. Some new *rasa-s* were proposed in addition to the original eight. Or it was thought that the *rasa-s* were unlimited in number, corresponding to every aspect of enjoyment in the theatre (Lollaṭa, quoted in *Abhinavabhāratī*, vol. I, p. 298). Dhanaṃjaya's theory (IV. 43 ff.) of a continuum of *rasa* harmonizing with four zones or phases in thought is interesting (and is partly anticipated by Nāyaka with only three zones),

but does not seem to have been followed up with further investigations.

After Abhinavagupta, the theory of Bhoja (eleventh century) is the most important contribution to aesthetics, providing a kind of biological and psychological basis for the science (*Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* V. 1, pp. 704-5; *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, ch. XI, vol. II, pp. 429ff.). It appears to be diametrically opposed to Abhinavagupta's theory in that, instead of universalization, it maintains that the highest aesthetic experience is a supreme form of self-assertion, *abhimāna* or egoism, *ahaṃkāra*. This might be described as self-realization, the fullest development of the individual instead of his absorption into the universal. However, it is another theory intended to explain the same facts of experience, of enjoyment, and is supported by numerous quotations from the literature. Ultimately, according to Bhoja, there is only one *rasa*, namely the sensitive, *śṛṅgāra*. At the highest point of development, the emotion 'love,' *rati*, ceases to be an emotion but absorbs all the other emotions into itself in the form of love of these and becomes the *rasa*, 'egoism'. This happens, Bhoja says, because each emotion is a kind of love, the love of a particular type of thought-activity, such as humour or mirth and even of such activities as being indignant in the case of the emotion, 'indignation', *amarṣa*. In the *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, Bhoja describes *rasa* in the sense of the sensitive or 'self-assertion' as a kind of quality of this egoism. Logically this is difficult to follow, but if *rasa* is ultimately one, then the ultimate 'sensitive'

is the same as the 'egoism,' but represents it as enjoyment whereas egoism explains its occurrence. Bhoja's theory, like Nāyaka's from which some of its concepts are derived, stresses the enjoyment aspect of the aesthetic experience, from which the long tradition of the *Nāṭya-śāstra* had started out. The opposition between it and Abhinavagupta's theory, however, depends on a metaphysical question of the nature of the supposed 'soul' in relation to which the experience (assertion or transcendence) would take place. If that question could be eliminated, the opposition could perhaps be resolved. If there is no soul, as the Buddhists and many modern philosophers have held, then a theory resembling Abhinavagupta's would best account for the facts, though Bhoja's contribution offers some useful explanations of what takes place at what he regards as the lower levels of experience. The effective discussion in Indian aesthetics terminates at the point where scientific investigation is replaced by metaphysical speculation.

III

THE THEORY OF COMPOSITION

The term ' poetics ', often used, is not very appropriate as an equivalent for what in Sanskrit has been known as *kāvyakriyākalpa* or *alaṃkāraśāstra* and more recently as *sāhityavidyā* or *sāhityaśāstra*. Aristotle's *Poetics*, from which the English term is borrowed, is mainly on the subject of dramaturgy and aesthetics. In India, the study of composition, including such topics as figures of speech, is an extension of linguistics, of grammar and lexicography. The earliest discussion known which relates to it is in fact in Yāska's lexicon (*Nighaṇṭu* III. 13 and *Nirukta* III. 13-8). Here some figures of speech are treated, not, however, from the point of view of literary criticism but simply as modes of expression, as linguistic phenomena. Apparently because of its independent origin, the study of the theory of composition continued to be to some extent separate from the tradition of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, though all the critics are aware of their close relationship. The combination of the two branches of study begins in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* itself, where the language of the theatre is treated in many of its aspects, including figures of speech and qualities of style. Effective expression is obviously an important component of the

acting of the causes and effects of emotion which produces *rasa.* Those on the other hand who wrote special treatises on *alaṃkāraśāstra* all recognize the importance of *rasa,* though they may simply refer for its detailed treatment to other treatises (i.e. the *Nāṭyaśāstra,* etc.). Though the difference may be one simply of emphasis, it has tended to produce different theories. A specialist in the questions of modes of expression may tend to lose sight of the aesthetic purpose of literature. The best critics, however, kept both aspects in view and some of them wrote on both in detail.

The earliest theory known to us which seeks to give a general definition of the beauty of literature, instead of just separate descriptions of figures, is that of *vakratā,* 'crookedness' or 'curvedness', more freely 'figurativeness' or 'indirectness'. We find it in the work of Bhāmaha, though it is not certain that he was the first to propound it. His work happens to be the oldest special treatise on *alaṃkāraśāstra* now available, though he had several predecessors in the field whose writings are apparently lost. Even the *Nāṭyaśāstra* places first, among its thirty-six 'characteristics' *lakṣaṇa-s* of dramatic composition, 'ornamentation', *bhūṣaṇa,* stated to consist in the use of *alaṃkāra-s,* in the sense of figures of speech, and of qualities of style (ch. XVI, Baroda ed.; four figures only, but ten qualities, are described later in the same ch.). The term *alaṃkāra,* 'ornament' or (specific) 'beauty', used for the figures of speech but often also in a wider sense,

is practically a synonym for *bhūṣaṇa*. Thus it is implied that all figures (and qualities) accepted in dramatic literature, or in literature generally, are in some sense beautiful (ornament and ornamental are not quite happy equivalents in English because they seem to imply only external and dispensable accessories, whereas the *alaṃkāra-s* for Bhāmaha are essential, include beauties intrinsic to literature and not detachable from it). This beauty in literature, according to Bhāmaha, consists in a kind of deviation from ordinary everyday expressions, an added expressiveness created by the genius of the author. Literature follows a 'curved' route, so to say, instead of the shortest line, uses indirect expressions, takes in additional meanings, as it were a wider prospect of the country traversed. Thus the characteristic of all beauties of literature, of all accepted *alaṃkāra-s*, is their crookedness or curvedness, *vakratā* (I. 36, II. 85).

Crooked or curved expressions include in the first place the generally recognized figures of speech, such as simile, *upamā*, bringing in a comparison and metaphor, *rūpaka*, making an apparent identification by using a word in a transferred sense. Other figures defined by Bhāmaha (chs. II and III) and prominent in *kāvya* are fancy, *utprekṣā*, bringing in imaginary activities and feelings of natural phenomena, circumlocution, *paryāyokta*, which may be a euphemism concealing a blunt statement, contrast, *vyatireka*, and exaggeration, *atiśayokti*. The definitions include particular limitations, such as that, in the case of

exaggeration, there must be a suitable pretext for it, it is not just a matter of any wild or absurd statement (II. 84-5). Bhāmaha's *alaṃkāra-s* are not all figures of speech or of expression in any strict sense. On the contrary, many of them have to do only with the meaning, the subject matter, not with the expression except in the sense that it gives effective expression to the meaning. Thus 'having *rasa*' *rasavant*, in which the sensitive and the other *rasa-s* appear clearly, is an *alaṃkāra* (III. 6) depending on the meaning. 'Coincidence' *samāhita* is simply a fortunate coincidence brought into the story, such as a chance meeting (III. 10). Bhāmaha seems to leave open the question of 'naturalistic description' *svabhāvokti*, which some earlier writers had proposed as an *alaṃkāra* (II. 93-4). This again relates to the subject described, where the expression may be as simple and direct as possible. It would seem that if the subject is beautiful then its description will count as *alaṃkāra*; merely its selection by the author satisfies the principle of 'curvature', for he has contrived his matter in such a way as to include it; but Bhāmaha does not explain.

Thus Bhāmaha's *alaṃkāra* includes all beauties of literature. In his preliminary discussion (I. 13 ff.) he concludes that there are two kinds of 'ornament', namely the expression *śabda* and the meaning *artha*. The ornament or beauty of expression includes the choice of grammatical expressions, good or beautiful expression, *sauśabdya*, to which Bhāmaha devotes a chapter (VI). The beauty of meaning includes most

of the 'figures', starting with metaphor, but is further extended to cover the literary application of epistemology and logic, discussed in chapter V. The logical middle terms, *hetu-s*, in literature (V. 47-55) are beautiful things. Bhāmaha had rejected simple 'middle term' *hetu* as a figure, on the ground that there is no beauty, no curvedness, in it, but when beautiful objects are brought in as middle terms in literary arguments he welcomes them. Similarly there may be logical examples, *dṛṣṭānta-s*, in literature (V. 55 ff.), giving the evidence for the concomitance of middle terms with predicates, which are beautiful. Udbhaṭa later reduced these two to simple *alaṃkāra-s*, namely *kāvyahetu* and *kāvyadṛṣṭānta*.

Bhāmaha's definition of literature, *kāvya*, is simply that it is 'expression and meaning combined' *śabdārthau sahitau* (I. 16), but this has to be qualified in the light of the discussion immediately preceding it to the effect that both the expression and the meaning are *alaṃkāra*, are beautiful, and further that this beauty may be defined as *vakratā*, crookedness or curvedness. It is to be noted that Bhāmaha's approach to his subject is empiricist: he takes up the *alaṃkāra-s* proposed by his predecessors and either accepts or rejects them according to whether he finds them beautiful or not. He is not elaborating a system from speculative principles but building on previous studies in the light of examples from literature.

Bhāmaha has no use for the distinction of literature into two styles: his *alaṃkāra-s* or beauties are general in

application. As for the qualities, *guṇa-s*, taken by some critics to be the basis for distinguishing styles, he notes only three of the ten given in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, ignoring the rest. Two of these three, 'sweetness' and 'clarity', he regards as desirable in all literature. He explains them as the very general qualities that the subject matter is not too detailed and is easily understood. Thirdly he remarks that some like 'strength', meaning much compounding of words, but does not express any opinion on it. No doubt the two qualities he accepts would override the enjoyment of this kind of strength. Some of the qualities he ignores are partly covered by other topics in his theory, in different terms. Thus the *alaṃkāra-s* 'condensed expression', *samāsokti* and 'exalted', *udātta* may cover the qualities 'concentration' and 'exaltation', and the qualities be assimilated to the ornaments or figures instead of forming a separate category. He calls 'developed meaning' essential in literature and this would partly cover at least two of the traditional qualities: it is simply part of *artha* in general. In Bhāmaha's theory, then, it appears everything in literature is brought under his general principles of 'expression', 'meaning', 'beauty' (*alaṃkāra*) and 'curvedness'.

Ānandavardhana's (ninth century) theory of indirectness or indirectly revealed meaning is a variation on Bhāmaha's curvedness. He holds that in the best literature instead of direct statements (simple *vācya*) we find meanings 'to be manifested' or 'to be revealed', *vyaṅgya*, which he also calls 'being understood'

pratīyamāna or 'being implied'. Whatever meanings may appear to be stated, *vācya*, the reader aware of the implications of the sentence or the situation may understand something quite different. Already in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* we found that the main emotions in literature are not stated but indicated indirectly through their causes and effects. Thus Ānandavardhana holds (p. 50) that the *rasa* produced always results from his meaning to be revealed, not that to be stated. Then the *alaṃkāra-s*, which he takes in the restricted sense of figures of speech, are also meanings to be revealed. Thirdly the subject matter, *vastu*, itself may consist of meanings to be revealed, in that what the characters say may consist of indirect insinuations, equivocations and the like. In effect, Ānandavardhana has generalized the *Nāṭyaśāstra* method of presentation to apply to all the elements in literature; he has unified the theory and assimilated Bhāmaha's curvature to the *Nāṭyaśāstra*'s indirect representation.

Kuntaka in the eleventh century revived the theory of curvedness. His analysis of literature appears to be more scientific than those of the other critics and his principles more comprehensive. He takes from linguistics the analysis of speech into a series of levels, of which he finds six: the phonetic, lexical, grammatical, sentential, contextual and compositional (pp. 14 and 29 ff.). Each level has its own specific kinds of curvedness. Thus at the phonetic level we have such effects as alliteration and rhyme (described by other critics as *alaṃkāra-s*) and other uses of sound giving beauty or

additional expressiveness. Lexical curvedness accounts for all effects produced by choice of vocabulary. Grammatical curvedness covers variations in grammatical construction and the resulting emphasis on some aspect of the subject matter; it includes a variety of personification, when an inanimate object is made the grammatical agent in a sentence.

Under sentential curvedness we find most of the traditional *alaṃkāra-s*, to the extent that Kuntaka accepts them at all, because they are figures of complete sentences. However, Kuntaka limits the *alaṃkāra-s* to those which are strictly figures of speech, modes of expression (*abhidhāprakāra*, p. 174 of the edition, but not properly edited there; for a large part of Kuntaka's text we still have to go to manuscripts and quotations in other works). Therefore he rejects half the *alaṃkāra-s* accepted by Bhāmaha, mostly because they are beauties in the subject matter, not in the expression, retaining only eighteen.

Contextual curvedness is when the parts of a literary work, its 'contexts' *prakaraṇa-s*, are arranged in such a way as to produce as much *rasa* as possible (Kuntaka everywhere emphasizes the supreme importance of *rasa*). For this purpose details in the source story are changed or new ones invented (for example Kālidāsa has invented the curse and Duṣyanta's loss of memory in his *Abhijñānaśākuntala*, which transforms the character of the hero and thereby enhances the sensitive experience). The long descriptive 'contexts' in good epics and other large *kāvya-s* are so

arranged as to develop *rasa*. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* method of construction of plots, with the five conjunctions *saṃdhi-s*, again proposes contexts capable of being contrived to develop *rasa*. Likewise the acts of a play are contexts to be arranged to suit the *rasa*.

Compositional curvedness considers an entire literary work in relation to its source. Thus the main *rasa* of a well-known source may be changed. A different objective may be substituted for the hero to attain. At this level, Kuntaka lists six dramas all on the same story, the main story of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. They are all very beautiful, yet they are quite different from one another because, though the story appears to be the same, they are contrived in very different ways (presenting different scenes on the stage, changing the characterizations, changing the significance of the whole story and so on, by curvedness or deviation from the source in different directions). Thus we find the 'beautiful expression' *vicitrā abhidhā* of literature at six levels, which is everywhere 'curved expression' *vakrokti* (p. 22).

On the other side, that of the subject matter, *vastu*, as opposed to the expression, Kuntaka also speaks of curvedness (p. 134, etc.), its beauties selected by the author or 'imposed' *āhārya* imaginatively. This is discussed particularly in relation to the three higher levels of expression, sentence, context and composition, where alone complete meanings are in question. Here also the capacity of the subject matter to produce *rasa* comes in, the 'having *rasa*' of the subject matter, but

not as an *alaṃkāra*. Thus all the aspects of literature are covered.

Later in the eleventh century, Mahiman tried to account for the same facts of literature by means of his theory of inference, noted above in connection with *rasa*. All the types of 'to be revealed' or 'being understood' meaning discussed by Ānandavardhana are explained by Mahiman as matters of inference in strict logical form and he identifies the middle terms and other necessary parts of the inference in each case. Thus in the works of Ānandavardhana, Kuntaka and Mahiman we find three different general theories applied to describe the same facts, moreover often with identical examples from literature as the evidence which has to be explained. Thus particularly in the case of the two eleventh century critics the theories are elaborated to account for the facts; the examples are not being selected to suit a preconceived theory. For instance the following phrase is quoted by Ānandavardhana from Bāṇa's *Harṣacarita*:

> When this great dissolution has occurred you are now the survivor to maintain the Earth (p. 291).

Here 'survivor' *śeṣa* is also the name of the Dragon Śeṣa who is supposed to support the Earth. For Ānandavardhana (pp. 297 and 528) this example illustrates the power of a word to give a revealed meaning, which supplants the directly stated meaning according to his theory. Kuntaka (p. 95) takes up the same

example and describes it as lexical curvedness, the author having chosen an apt synonym among possible expressions, hinting at something other than the subject with brilliant effect. Mahiman (p. 506) instead finds in this example support for his doctrine that words have only one kind of power, *śakti*, to express meanings, namely simple 'expression' *abhidhā* (Ānandavardhana argues for three different powers, especially that of 'revealing' the 'to be revealed' meaning). Here *śeṣa* just expresses its meaning or meanings, directly. Anything beyond this direct expression is a matter of inference.

In the synthesis of the study of the language of literature with that of the aesthetic experience, Bhoja is the most comprehensive critic. In several ways he is the greatest Indian critic, especially for the great wealth of illustrations amassed in his works, all of which are beautiful illustrations and precisely the kind we would wish to see covered by a satisfactory theory. In a 'progressive' manner, he tries to synthesize the theories of many of his predecessors, from the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin down to Bhaṭṭanāyaka, Abhinavagupta and Dhanaṃjaya, together with other critics whose names are not known to us. Probably he was a contemporary of Kuntaka and these two great critics did not know each other's work. In addition, Bhoja applies the linguistic science of the great grammarians, Pāṇini, Bhartṛhari and others, and the science of interpretation of the Mīmāṃsā tradition based on the *Sūtra* text of Jaimini.

Bhoja has an analysis according to linguistic levels, namely the word, the sentence and the composition, *prabandha*. On the other hand he starts out, in his greater work, from Bhāmaha's definition of literature as expression and meaning combined (*Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, vol. I, p. 2). This combination *sāhitya*, he maintains, has twelve aspects (pp. 3 and 223), which form a kind of bridge from the study of grammar (his chs. I-VI) to that of *rasa* (ch. XI).

The first four of these (ch. VII) relate to the powers of an expression taken by itself to carry meanings. (1) 'Expression' *abhidhā* or the basic power to express meaning has for Bhoja three functions, *vṛtti-s*, which we may translate simply as primary, secondary and tertiary (the secondary includes transfer and the like as the basis of metaphor and so on, the tertiary is the unexpected cases when the meaning is totally different from the primary meaning and may even contradict it) (pp. 223 ff.). (2) The wish of the speaker, *vivakṣā*, may be clear from the intonation or in other ways (pp. 238 ff.). (3) When the meaning of an expression is in fact that of another expression Bhoja calls its power 'intention', *tātparya*, under which he includes the meaning 'to be revealed' of Ānandavardhana's theory (pp. 246 ff.). (4) Analysis *pravibhāga* by the method of agreement and difference has more to do with grammar and lexicon than with literature, but it touches on such relevant matters as synonyms (pp. 263 ff.).

The next four aspects (ch. VIII) concern expressions when connected to other expressions. (5) The first

of these is the mutual expectancy, *vyapekṣā*, between expressions (pp. 268 ff.). (6) Capability, *sāmarthya*, is the meanings of expressions having power to combine in another meaning (pp. 284 ff.). (7) In a sentence a series, *anvaya*, of expressions has a meaning (pp. 286 ff.). (8) Unity of meaning, *ekārthībhāva*, includes the further extension when a whole literary work, such as an epic, combines into a 'great sentence', *mahāvākya*, having a single meaning (pp. 297 ff.). As an example of this Bhoja indicates that Kumāradāsa's epic *Jānakīharaṇa* means 'act like Rāma, not like Rāvaṇa'.

The last four aspects (chs. IX and following) cover the main topics of literary criticism. (9) Faults, *doṣa-s*, are avoided in good literature. (10) There are qualities, *guṇa-s*. (11) There are figures of speech or ornaments, *alaṃkāra-s*. (12) Aesthetic experience, *rasa*, is never absent. These four are applied by Bhoja at the sentence level and again (in ch. XI) at the level of entire compositions (the first eight aspects variously occur at the word and sentence levels). At the sentence level he sets out his versions of the faults, qualities and figures mostly familiar from earlier critics.

At the composition level Bhoja (pp. 460 ff. in vol. II) develops his own doctrine of the avoiding of faults in the story (p. 460), qualities of a composition such as that it relates to the four ends of life, is contrived with the conjunctions and other structural elements, has appropriate metres and so on (pp. 460-1 and 470-2) and ornaments of a composition such as descriptions

of places, times, characters, political activities and pleasures and other special features of long *kāvya-s* (pp. 461 and 471-9). These qualities and ornaments of compositions are mostly developed from Daṇḍin's description of the characteristics of epic *kāvya-s*. Bhoja sets out his original theory of *rasa*, briefly sketched above, at the sentence level, evidently because every sentence in a good *kāvya* contributes to the aesthetic experience. At the composition level, Bhoja defines forty-eight types or genres of literature (pp. 461-70) in relation to *rasa* never being absent (p. 480) and to the qualities and ornaments of compositions which they may have and which serve as causes for *rasa* never being absent (pp. 461, 472 and 479). Thus it is stressed that the most important element in literary composition is that *rasa* is never absent from a *kāvya* and the theories of aesthetics and of composition are unified.

In connection with *kāvya* being defined as expression and meaning combined, and the various elaborations of the definition by qualifying 'expression', 'meaning' and 'combined' (or 'combination'), it is desirable to add a note here on the question, sometimes raised, whether there is anything further which might be combined. There are other definitions of *kāvya*, some of which might appear to propose new elements. In the first place, Vāmana in the eighth century is the champion of style, *rīti*, which Bhāmaha had dismissed as superfluous though Kuntaka redefined the styles in relation to his 'natural' and 'imposed' subject

matter and with an original set of qualities. Vāmana declares (p. 4) that style is the essence, *ātman*, of *kāvya* and defines style as a special arrangement of words. Is this ' essence ' (or this ' soul ' as some would translate *ātman* here) another element, with which expression and meaning might combine? Surely not, for it is defined in terms of words, *pada-s*, thus of expressions having meanings. Then the ' special arrangement ' according to Vāmana is constituted by the ten qualities, redefined from those of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. But Vāmana is so far committed to the conception of expression and meaning in *kāvya* that he adds the innovation of dividing each quality into two, one of expressions and one of meanings. Ānandavardhana thought that his *dhvani*, the ' sound ' within *kāvya* which carried the ' to be revealed ' meanings, was the essence or soul. Nevertheless he describes it in terms of the meanings revealed and it seems to inhere in the expressions used, as with the grammarians from whom the term is borrowed. Others, again, such as Rājaśekhara, have poetically and figuratively called *rasa* the essence or soul (of *kāvya* personified). But *rasa* is the effect of *kāvya*, not an element constituting it except in a metaphorical sense transferring the effect to the cause. In another sense it is part of the meaning, being produced by the subject matter effectively communicated through the expression. Thus we should beware of false analogies drawn from poetic statements. It is of course universally agreed that *rasa* is of the greatest importance and this, and its relationship to *kāvya*, have been indicated above.

When other aspects of *kāvya* are called the 'essence' or 'life', such as curved expression or harmony, *aucitya*, it is again the expression or the meaning or their combination which is in question. We find no third element combined with expression and meaning.

IV

THE ENJOYMENT OF AN ĀKHYĀYIKĀ

Interesting as the general theories may be, it is the practical analysis of literary works which is the most rewarding part of criticism. We can start out from the position just reached in Bhoja's theory, namely the forty-eight genres or divisions of literature as its highest units. From his works, supplemented by those of other critics, we could survey the whole field of *kāvya* as a varied collection of compositions *prabandha-s* which have been found beautiful.

Bhoja has first divided all *prabandha-s* into two classes, those to be seen, *prekṣya*, and those to be heard, *śravya* (p. 461). Those to be seen are further characterized as 'to be acted' *abhineya*, whilst those to be heard are simply 'not to be acted' *anabhineya*: thus we have here a proper dichotomy. Bhoja has twenty-four types in each division, introducing a slight distortion, it must be admitted, for the sake of balance. In fact rather more than twenty-four types of dramatic performance have been described, if we take all the available critical works, and Bhoja has condensed the minor types a little (in *Indian Kāvya Literature*, ch. V, thirty-nine types of drama were found). On the other hand

Bhoja had some difficulty in making up a set of twenty-four types of composition not to be acted, or at least he extended the field of literature somewhat and introduced some new sub-divisions. Thus he sets up the genre *parvabandha* for the Great Epic *Mahābhārata* (p. 470), which is generally regarded as tradition, *itihāsa*, rather than as *kāvya*, as a source of subjects for literature, though in so far as it is enjoyable and productive of *rasa* some of the later critics allow it to be *kāvya* as well. Similarly Bhoja has, as a type of *kāvya*, the *upākhyāna*, which means episodes or rather subsidiary narratives from the *Mahābhārata* (p. 469). Bhoja does not offer any further dichotomies but instead takes up types of composition and their characteristics as described by his predecessors as a basis. His series of types not to be acted begins with the more 'historical' *ākhyāyikā*, *upākhyāna*, *ākhyāna*, *nidarśana* and continues with the branches of fiction and then the divisions of poetry. He concludes by setting up a type for his own *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, as a work illuminating many branches of learning and the structure of the arts and literature in the form of a *kāvya* (it is also an anthology of good literature).

Taking an example from the beginning of Bhoja's exposition, we find he mentions the *Mādhavikā* and *Harṣacarita* to illustrate the *ākhyāyikā* or 'biography' (p. 469). The first of these seems to have been lost, so we may take the second, written by Bāṇa in the seventh century. The biography, *ākhyāyikā*, had been described by earlier critics such as Bhāmaha

(I. 25-7) and Kohala and in the *Amarakośa* (I. 5. 5, with Sarvānanda's commentary, which quotes Kohala), making clear that it narrates events which had actually happened. Bhoja notes from his predecessors that there is the theme of the abduction of a girl (in the *Harṣacarita* this is Harṣa's sister, Rājyaśrī), then war, reunion and the success of the hero (Harṣa rescues his sister and the *kāvya* concludes by indicating his accession to Royal Fortune). The life of the hero is narrated either by himself or, as in this example, by a follower of his (in his case Bāṇa, who attended Harṣa's court). The *ākhyāyikā* is composed in Sanskrit and in prose and is divided into chapters. Traditionally it is said to contain occasional verses in the metres *vaktra* and *aparavaktra*. This is true of the *Harṣacarita*, though it contains verses in other metres as well, as Rudraṭa had noted (XVI. 24 ff.).

The style of the *Harṣacarita* is according to Kuntaka the 'beautiful', *vicitra*, his redefined *gauḍīya*. This agrees with Mammaṭa (end of ch. VIII) and Ruyyaka's comments, where *ākhyāyikā-s* in general are found to be 'bold' *vikaṭa* in composition and never 'delicate' *masṛṇa* even when the *rasa* is the sensitive. As a matter of fact there is hardly any of the sensitive in the *Harṣacarita*: there is a certain amount of the heroic, but the main experience appears to be the marvellous, starting from the preliminary scene in Heaven and hinted at in several places by the author. The history of Harṣa is in fact extraordinary, since in his childhood there was nothing to suggest that he was destined to

become Emperor in another city, after the murder of the last of the Maukhari line and of his own elder brother. His ascetic life was dedicated to the punishment of these crimes and the establishment of a rule free from the misdeeds which history shows to be almost inseparable from kingship. A natural, spontaneous style would therefore seem inappropriate. Instead, the disciplined, studied beauties admired here by Kuntaka are in harmony with the narrative.

Bhoja has noted (*Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, vol. II. pp. 472 and 475) some of his ornaments of a composition in this *ākhyāyikā*. Thus it opens with a 'salutation' (to Śiva). There is a fine description of Harṣa's riding-elephant Darpaśāta. Then the youth of a prince is described. As a matter of fact Harṣa is extremely young in the crucial part of his life presented in this biography and is not more than sixteen even at the end of the narrative, but in Chapter IV there are passages describing his childhood. What for Bhoja is an ornament of a composition is for Kuntaka 'contextual curvedness'. The latter has noted a variety of this in the repeated but varied descriptions of sunrise, or the end of night (Adyar transcript of the *Vakroktijīvita*, p. 218). The Jaina critic Vinayacandra has quoted (pp. 62 ff.) a series of brilliant descriptions from the *Harṣacarita* to illustrate an author's skill in describing the world. These include the description of Harṣa himself in chapter II, that of the last illness of his father in chapter V, the marvellous description of the march of the army in chapter VII and Rājyaśrī's

preparations for suicide and rescue by Harṣa in chapter VIII.

We can best illustrate Bāṇa's style in this work, and his powers of observation and presentation, by quoting from some of these passages selected by Vinayacandra. In a single sentence the army is roused from its sleep and in a great confusion of noisy incidents begins its march:

> Then as the drums were crying out, the benedictory drums were sounding, the kettle drums were roaring, the cocks were crowing, the conches were being blown, the hubbub of the camp was gradually increasing, all the house-servants were busily engaged in their customary tasks, the directions were held in the clamour of tent pegs meeting the blows of rapid mallets, the companies of soldiers were being awakened by their officers, the darkness of the night was being plundered by the light of thousands of torches which people had lit, loving couples were being made to get up by the prodding of the feet of the maids of the watch, elephant drivers were opening their eyes as their sleep was destroyed by sharp and pungent commands ..... tents, screens, marquees, curtains and awnings were being rolled up into bags by the quartermasters, short-necked leather

bags were being filled with bundles of pegs, the storekeepers were loading supplies, nearby houses were being hemmed in by treasure jars and strings of caskets being loaded on numerous stationary animals by the elephant drivers, vicious elephants were being loaded with sets of equipment put on by skilful slaves keeping at a distance . . . stocks of fodder and grain were being plundered by the common local people who had run up when the elephants and horses moved off, donkeys with oil presses mounted on them were moving on, the roads were being seized and pounded by swarms of wagons noisy with the squeaking of wheels, the oxen were charged with supplies being unexpectedly thrown on them, strong bullocks sent on first lingered from greed to get the nearby fodder, the kitchens of the great vassals were proceeding in front, the ways out through the spaces between the huts were hemmed in, being possessed by the cheers of hundreds of friends of the banner-brigades hurrying out in front, nearby witnesses were being retained by elephant keepers who were being pelted with clods by people getting out of huts shaken by the feet of elephants, poor families were fleeing from huts which vicious beasts were splitting as they crashed into them, merchants were roused as

> oxen with their wealth were running away in distress at the uproar . . . the world was eating dust, at the time of marching . . . (pp. 311-6).

King Prabhākaravardhana's illness:

> . . . the household staff busy preparing reserves of medicines, the terrible thirst of the sick man inferred from the repeated summoning of the water carriers, watered buttermilk being chilled in a cooler packed in ice, a spatula being cooled in camphor powder put in a white moistened cloth, a mouthful of sour cream in a new box smeared with a non-drying paste, soft lotus stalks covered with wet and tender lotus leaves, vessels of drinking water on the ground with their water pervaded by bunches of blue water-lilies on their stalks, boiled water being made cool by pouring it in a stream, a sharp fragrance of pink sugar being diffused, the eyes of the sick man resting on a cooler full of sand placed in a trough . . . (p. 230).

Several critics have quoted sentences from the *Harṣacarita* to illustrate figures of speech. Thus Kuntaka quotes (p. 193) for 'fancy':

> Mandākinī (the river of heaven), Chief Queen of the King of the Seven Oceans,

> was . . . as if the casting off of the slough of the celestial snake (p. 29).

The critic quotes this again (Adyar transcript, p. 191) for compounding of figures, in this case fancy and metaphor. The fancy partakes of the nature of metaphor because there is no actual movement to be expressed by 'casting off'.

Ānandavardhana quotes (p. 245) a pun which 'reveals' a contradiction (one figure revealing another):

> Where the women were walking like elephants and virtuous, pale and loving wealth, dark and wearing rubies, their mouths bright with white teeth and exhaling the fragrance of wine (p. 144).

The second meaning is:

> Where the women were going to the cemetery keepers and virtuous, Gaurīs and not loving Śiva, dark and the colour of red lotuses, their mouths pure like excellent brahmans and exhaling the fragrance of wine.

With this series of contradictions revealed by puns, Ānandavardhana contrasts (p. 246) a sentence which has either a direct contradiction or a direct pun, not one revealing the other:

> Sarasvatī . . . is as if a combination of contradictory categories, for she has nightfall near the form of the Sun (p. 42).

The pun is on the word *bāla*, so that instead of 'nightfall' we can understand 'the darkness of her hair'.

Mahiman also quotes some of Bāṇa's puns, for example (p. 401):

> Mighty Time, called 'Summer', yawned with a loud laugh, white as blossoming jasmines, curbing the yoke of Spring (p. 69).

Mahākāla also means 'Śiva' and in the epithets common to Time and Śiva we also have condensed expression, *samāsokti*.

Bāṇa's puns are balanced by straightforward descriptions, as we have seen, and Mammaṭa (p. 446, Dvivedi's ed.) and Mahiman (p. 454) have quoted two verses of naturalistic description, *svabhāvokti*, depicting a horse awaking, scratching the earth with its hoof and rubbing its eye with it and so on (p. 136).

According to Kuntaka, in this 'beautiful' style figures of speech are used in a particular way (p. 61):

> So tell us which country, reduced to demerit through his coming here, has been pervaded by the anguish of absence and brought to emptiness? Or where is he going? Or who is this youth who, like another Kāma, has carried off the egoism of Śiva's defiance? Or of what father, whose asceticism has flourished, does he delight the heart, raining ambrosia, as the *kaustubha* gem that of Viṣṇu? Or who is his mother, hailed by the Three

> Worlds, like the dawn (bringing forth) a great brilliance? Or which syllables share the merit of composing his fame? (pp. 38-9).

The first sentence here, equivalent to 'Where has he come from?', and the last, equivalent to 'What is his name?', have the lustre of the figure 'praise of what is not the subject' *aprastutapraśaṃsā*. It is really Dadhīca who is being praised, although his country and the syllables are the subjects of the sentences.

Bhoja has illustrated his aspect of the combination of expression and meaning called the 'wish of the speaker' *vivakṣā* from the above context (*Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa*, vol. I, p. 239). Dadhīca's companion Vikukṣi when replying mentions his own name too, but very modestly:

> *mām api tasyaiva sugṛhītanāmno devasya bhṛtyaparamāṇuṃ Vikukṣināmānam avadhārayatu bhavatī.*

The apt selection of a word (*śeṣa*) by Bāṇa in this *kāvya*, discussed by Ānandavardhana, Kuntaka and Mahiman, has been noted above.

Thus to facilitate our enjoyment of this biography the critics have drawn attention to the way in which Bāṇa has composed it, from the selection of words and the manner of using figures, up through the descriptions of scenes in the narrative to its overall style, appropriate to the subject matter, and the characteristic features of the genre *ākhyāyikā*. Some of their more general appreciation might be added, such as that of Soḍḍhala.

This eleventh century novelist declares that Bāṇa is 'emperor' of authors because of his *Harṣacarita* (p. 154; as the hero became emperor of men, so the author narrating this became emperor of writers). Soḍḍhala maintains that Bāṇa combines the separate excellences of Abhinanda, Vākpatirāja and Kālidāsa, which are 'expression', 'meaning' and *rasa* (p. 157).

V

THE ENJOYMENT OF A PLAY

Bhoja has compiled his description of the twenty-four types of *kāvya* ' to be acted ' from the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and some other old source and does not there give examples. The *nāṭaka* stands first and elsewhere Bhoja has referred to and quoted from many *nāṭaka-s* to illustrate all aspects of critical theory. Among the most prominent of his examples of *nāṭaka-s* is Bhavabhūti's *Uttara-rāmacarita*, which he refers to particularly for the aesthetic experience and the emotions related to it. We need not here go through all the characteristics of a *nāṭaka* taken by Bhoja from the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and look for them in this play; the most essential will suffice and we can take some help also from some of the other critics in relation to them.

A *nāṭaka* is a play in from five to ten acts (meaning from five to ten nights' performance), with all five conjunctions in its plot, based on a well-known, *prakhyāta*, story. That the story is well known does not mean that the dramatist invents nothing, as we have seen already from Kuntaka's explanation of compositional curvedness (six different plays on Rāma; in the present instance we have a different part of Rāma's life staged). Bahurūpamiśra points out (on Dhanaṃjaya I. 15) that

in the *Uttararāmacarita* the story, *itivṛtta*, is only partly well known and partly invented, *utpādya*. Kṣemendra (*Aucityavicāracarcā*, pp. 16-7) quotes from its fourth act to illustrate the appropriateness in a composition that a new fancy, not in the original *Rāmāyaṇa*, has been introduced, which enhances the beauty of the aesthetic experience through Rāma's son Lava following his father's valour: this is the scene where Lava takes possession of Rāma's sacrificial horse, released for the *aśvamedha*, and defies the soldiers supposed to guard it, whom he then proceeds to fight and defeat. Bahurūpamiśra also notes (on Dhanaṃjaya IV, 46 f.) that in Bhavabhūti's works we have examples of *rasa* produced by complete compositions, not just in single sentences. There is in other words a unity of aesthetic experience. In fact all the *rasa-s* are touched on in this play, but the others are subordinated to the main one. Kuntaka (pp. 238-9) states that this main *rasa* is the sensitive, *śṛṅgāra*, having been changed from the calmed, *śānta*, of the *Rāmāyaṇa* (*Uttara Kāṇḍa*) by compositional curvedness.

Bhoja has many comments on the sensitive and the corresponding emotion, love, *rati*, in this play, also on the closely related emotion, in his theory, affection, which relates especially to friendships. Thus when Rāma and Sītā look at the paintings, in Act I, they remember their happiness together even in the forest in exile. This develops the emotion of love and the consequent sensitive, in the state of union *saṃbhoga* (*Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, vol. II, p. 557, etc., Dhanika, p. 105).

After this Sītā is drowsy and Rāma makes her sleep, resting against him, thus further developing the same *rasa*. Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra (p. 28) here make the interesting comment that the convention of not showing anything ' disgusting ' *jugupsanīya* in the theatre has been broken by Bhavabhūti. Going to bed or going to sleep, as well as embracing, are usually not shown because of this convention, but in this case the unconventional scene of Sītā and Rāma lying down together and Sītā sleeping, resting on his chest, is not a fault because it serves the plot and is delightful. Conventions, then, are not absolute in the classical Indian theatre; it is a question of what is appropriate.

Rāma reflects on his happiness and their love, ripened over a long time, and Bhoja quotes this verse (I. 39) for love absorbing all other emotions into itself and ripening into *rasa* (*Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, vol. II, pp. 436-7). All this development prepares the audience to respond fully to the agony of the separation of Sītā and Rāma which follows immediately. Then in Act VI when Rāma sees Lava and Kuśa, not knowing who the boys are, he is strongly affected because their faces remind him of Sītā. This prepares the way for bringing her back to him in Act. VII. Though Bhoja's comments on ' affection ' mostly relate to Rāma's affection for his friends and to the affection which spontaneously arises between Lava and Lakṣmaṇa's son Candraketu (who again do not know each other), as well as Lava's unexpected feelings on seeing Rāma, it is also a part of Rāma's feeling for Sītā:

She is Fortune in my house, she is a brush
of ambrosia for my eyes,
this touch of hers is an abundant sandal-
wood juice on my body,
This arm round my neck is a cool, fine string
of pearls:
what of hers is not dear? Unless it is
unbearable separation (I. 38).

This verse is quoted by Bhoja for both 'affection' (vol. III, p. 750) and 'love' (vol. II, p. 558).

Since this is essentially a play about *dharma*, virtue or duty in the Brahmanical sense, Rāma always doing his duty as king regardless of his personal feelings, Bhoja refers to it for his special theory of varieties of the sensitive depending on the four ends of life and among them the sensitive in virtue, *dharmaśṛṅgāra*. This is found by Bhoja already in the scene of the gallery of paintings, where Rāma finds charming aspects even of the scenes of his exile (vol. III, p. 709), the exile which was an effect of his virtue. Then Bhoja quotes the verse:

Harder than a thunderbolt and softer than a
flower,
Who is worthy to know the hearts of those
who transcend the world? (II. 7)

And comments that this shows the firm and exalted hero in the sensitive in virtue, who is not overcome by emotions because of his deep disposition and his nobility

(vol. III, p. 708). Rāma is capable of the deepest love, yet he is also capable of banishing Sītā for the sake of his duty to satisfy public opinion. In spite of this, or as a contrast which heightens it, Bhoja also finds the sensitive in pleasure, *kāmaśṛṅgāra* (vol. III, p. 759), in the scene in the gallery of paintings where Rāma is reflecting on his happiness after Sītā falls asleep (I. 35).

In subordination to the main emotion, Bhoja points out many others which occur in this play: the transients, remembrance (vol. II, p. 583), bewilderment, *moha* (p. 589), depression (p. 591), reflection (p. 571), joy, *harṣa* (p. 566), envy (p. 585), indifference (p. 595); also the 'expressive' *sāttvika* emotions, paralysis, *stambha* (p. 574) and horripilation (p. 567). But all the other 'main' emotions, *sthāyibhāva-s*, occur also, though of course subordinate here to love. Bhoja points out examples of grief (p. 444), disgust (p. 594) and astonishment (p. 572). The aesthetic experiences resulting from these emotions are all developed at times. For example, when Lava expresses his feelings on seeing Rāma (VI. 11), Bhoja (p. 451) finds a mixture of *rasa-s*, of the kind in which one extinguishes others, as in a painting where strong colours extinguish weak colours. Here the *rasa-s*, heroic, *vīra*, proud, *uddhata* (a new *rasa* peculiar to Bhoja's theory) and independent, *svātantrya* (also new) are extinguished by the excess of astonishment, *vismaya* (which produces the marvellous *rasa*). The development of disgust, *jugupsā*, is remarkable in this play, because it always results from Rāma

doing his duty. Rāma himself expresses disgust when he has given the order for Sītā's banishment (I. 49), as Bhoja notes (p. 594). Then similarly he expresses his disgust at having to kill the harmless Śambūka (II. 10). Then Vāsantī reproaches Rāma (III. 26) for banishing Sītā after all his previous declarations of love and here Bhoja (p. 594) finds disgust in the 'increasing' stage (where it produces the horrific *bībhatsa rasa;* the *Sāhityamīmāṃsā,* p. 72, quotes this verse for *bībhatsa*).

Despite the originality of its construction, the *Uttararāmacarita* exemplifies the structure of a *nāṭaka* with the five conjunctions, *saṃdhi-s,* their limbs or parts and other dramatic elements. Dhanika (p. 23) points out two limbs, *aṅga-s,* of the obstacle, *avamarśa,* conjunction in Acts V and VI, in the fight between Lava and Candraketu. This is the decisive situation in the plot which might have ended in disaster, leaving no possibility of reunion between Rāma and Sītā (which of course is the objective of the play). Instead the antagonism is resolved in a fortunate way which leads to the restoration of Sītā. Bhoja points out a number of the dramatic characteristics, *lakṣaṇa-s,* including a moment of humour *parihāsa* (pp. 543-4), by way of relief from the prevailing suffering of the hero and heroine, when Tamasā teases Sītā for praising herself (though unintentionally). Dhanika, Śāradātanaya (p. 280), Siṃhabhūpāla (pp. 74, 211-2, etc.) and others have pointed out various other elements of dramatic construction which are very effective in this play.

Turning from the dramatic structure to the more general theory of composition, we find that Bhoja has illustrated some of his ornaments of a composition from this play. A verse in the painting gallery scene describing Hanumant is said (p. 467) to be a 'sub-plot' *patākā* used as such an ornament. This cannot of course refer to any sub-plot in the play itself, but belongs to the previous story of Rāma's war with Rāvaṇa. Probably precisely for this reason it is here simply an 'ornament', not part of the dramatic structure. The description of the princes in Acts IV, etc., is again an ornament of the composition (p. 475). The 'sentence of the actor' *bharatavākya* and final benediction at the end of the play, is in addition an ornament of a composition, according to Bhoja (p. 474), one which indicates the intention of the author through expressing the wish for an object connected with virtue, *dharma*.

Kuntaka finds examples here of his contextual curvedness (pp. 226-7, 235). In the painting gallery scene, one painting shows Rāma receiving the divine *jṛmbhaka* missiles from Viśvāmitra after killing Tāṭakā. Seeing this, Rāma expresses to the pregnant Sītā the wish that these divine missiles should attend on her offspring. Kuntaka points out that Lava uses these missiles in the fight in Act V. Since no one but Rāma had these missiles, as Sumantra remarks to Candraketu during the fight, they serve to identify his sons thus endowed through his wish. Thus the two contexts, in Acts I and V, are linked. The play within a play, *garbhāṅka*, in Act VII is another of Kuntaka's varieties

of contextual curvedness. Bhoja also notes it (vol. I, p. 120), as exemplifying the possibility of a composition within another composition. In this connection it may be noted that Bhoja (*Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa*, p. 742) finds in this play an example of a single sentence which is equivalent to a whole composition (I. 23). It summarises the story of Bhagīratha and according to Bhoja it contains all the five conjunctions of a complete plot.

At the sentence level, Bhoja notes various figures of speech, including 'being reminded' *smaraṇa* (p. 375), where Rāma in Act II recognizes the scene of his exile. As usual, even in such small details Bhoja picks examples which are significant for the play as a whole. He finds this figure again in Act III where Rāma recognizes the touch of the invisible Sītā (p. 376). Vāmana (IV. 3. 6) has quoted the verse translated above 'She is Fortune, etc.' (I. 38) for metaphor.

Further to his study of sentences, Bhoja has derived from the Mīmāṃsā and the *Vākyapadīya* a set of forty-eight principles or qualities in a sentence, *vākyadharma-s*. He introduces these (in *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* ch. IX) as a sort of transition from his first eight aspects of the combination of expression and meaning to the last four, from the more linguistic to the purely literary. They might be regarded as features of sentences less general than their aspects considered earlier but more general than the qualities, *guṇa-s*, and ornaments considered afterwards. Bhoja has illustrated most of these from *kāvya-s*, showing how literature uses the

same means of expression as the *Veda,* but in its own way. Thus for secondary meaning, *gauṇa,* he quotes (p. 309) the verse 'She is Fortune, etc.'. In a sentence this principle or quality of secondary meaning forms the basis for the ornament metaphor.

For the principle or quality of a sentence, 'implication' *vākyaśeṣa,* where something further has to be understood to complete the sense, Bhoja quotes (p. 324) a verse we have referred to above for 'disgust', where Vāsantī reproaches Rāma, which we may now translate:

> 'You are my life, you are my second heart,
> you are the moonlight of my eyes, you are
> the ambrosia to my body'
> —And so on; after humouring the innocent
> girl with hundreds of endearments
> that very one was . . . Hush! Or rather what
> reply is there to this? (III. 26)

We understand that Sītā was banished, which Vāsantī considers too horrible to say. Thus again a principle of interpretation used in establishing the details of the Vedic sacrifice has been exploited in literature for a dramatic effect. Another principle of a sentence illustrated by Bhoja (p. 316) from this play is 'induction' *ūha* in its Mīmāṃsā sense. The verse IV. 20, describing the appearance of Lava as a student, is used also in the *Mahāvīracarita* (I. 18) to describe Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa when they were students, with only one word modified to make it refer to two persons instead

of one. In Jaimini, *ūha* is used for the modification of a ritual act to suit a different context.

According to Kuntaka (end of ch. I) the style of Bhavabhūti's verses is the 'beautiful' *vicitra*. Presumably this would not apply to the prose, which is generally simpler (and does not resemble Bāṇa's); thus this style might here be regarded as a feature of sentences (verses) rather than of the whole composition.

At the word level Bhoja illustrates (*Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, vol. I, p. 231) a variety of the secondary function of expression, *abhidhā*, namely 'transfer', *upacāra*, from this play. Rāma expresses his disgust at having to kill Śambūka. Referring to his hand about to strike, he says: 'You are a limb of Rāma, who was able to banish Sītā' (II. 10). The word 'Rāma' here, according to Bhoja, thus takes on the special sense of 'most pitiless'. For a variety of mutual expectancy, *vyapekṣā*, between words Bhoja quotes yet again (p. 280) the verse 'She is Fortune, etc.'. Here the normal expectancy between some of the words is not satisfied because their primary senses are not possible; therefore we understand them in secondary senses.

So here again we discover from the critics how a *kāvya* was enjoyed, in its details as well as as a whole. It is not difficult, surely, to enjoy Bhavabhūti's plays, but we can get still more enjoyment when our attention is drawn to some of the finer details of the construction of a drama. The novelist Dhanapāla (tenth century) has compared Bhavabhūti's speech with an actress, moving with beautiful arrangements of words

(steps) and making the emotions and aesthetic experiences clear (*Tilakamañjarī,* introd. verse 30). Thus he points to the beauty of composition and the powerful depiction of emotion by Bhavabhūti and the harmony between these two.

VI

CONCLUSION

Our sketch of criticism in India is very incomplete, selecting just a few interesting points and avoiding a mass of detail. It is an attempt at characterization from a few samples. The critics have analysed the corpus of *kāvya* in several ways, according to genre or type of composition, to construction (dramatic construction, which we have hardly touched on, and which was extended in principle to all literature), to emotion and aesthetic experience and to composition in the more linguistic sense of building up sentences and so on. The dichotomy of genres into 'to be acted' and 'not to be acted' is generally a strict one, though it has sometimes been infringed (is anything absolute in art?), as in the performance of *campū-s* as dramatic monologues. That between fictitious subject matter and non-fictitious (well-known) is only one of degree though it is convenient to distinguish historical plays as *nāṭaka-s* from fictitious plays as *prakaraṇa-s*, prose biographies, *ākhyāyikā-s*, from novels, *kathā-s*, and so on. Daṇḍin's division into verse, prose and mixed (mixed includes especially drama, as well as *campū*) is obvious and apparently simple, but full of irregularities. There are rough divisions according to length, generally

observed by writers for practical reasons. Divisions by style could not be maintained by the critics, because styles kept changing, though sometimes they arise from a deeper principle akin to genre and harmonize with the *Nāṭyaśāstra's* division of dramas into 'violent' *āviddha* and 'delicate' *sukumāra.* The possibility of a division by *rasa-s,* which appears in the earliest account of drama and seems to have been an ancient tendency in the theatre, was not followed up. On the contrary the richness of mingling many *rasa-s,* though with one dominant, was preferred. Plays with specialized *rasa-s* thus continued only in a relatively minor position: heroic plays, *vyāyoga-s,* compassionate (or tragic) plays, *utsṛṣṭikāṅka-s,* comic plays, *prahasana-s,* furious plays, *ḍima-s,* and the *nāṭikā* as a sensitive play.

On the other hand the theory of composition increasingly takes *rasa* as its starting point, not a particular *rasa* but *rasa* in general as the aim of any literary work. The composition, *prabandha,* as a whole has *rasa* as its most essential characteristic and its qualities and ornaments are such as help to produce *rasa.* Similarly, compositional curvedness is the pursuit of *rasa* and the best authors have sought also to produce *rasa* in every context. These structural contexts are various. There are cantos, chapters and acts, but discussion is more often directed to somewhat smaller segments, namely the descriptive passages and the motifs used in dramatic construction, such as the supernatural missiles in the *Uttararāmacarita* or the ring in the *Puṣpadūṣitaka.* More important than any of these is the

purely dramatic construction of plots articulated into conjunctions, *saṃdhi-s*. These are not segments of text, however, like acts, but situations in the plot, though of course they can be located in the text. Each of the five conjunctions is divisible into up to a dozen or more 'limbs' or parts, *aṅga-s*, which again are not segments of text but incidents in the dramatic situation usually expressed in pieces of dialogue. Along with these, we have here also disregarded the numerous other elements of dramatic construction, including the characteristics, *lakṣaṇa-s*, 'other conjunctions', *vīthyaṅga-s*, *lāsyāṅga-s śilpakāṅga-s* and several other sets on which dramatists were found to have drawn in developing their plots with appropriate and sufficient action. Even the four modes, *vṛtti-s*, of stage business, which are largely non-textual in that they relate to gesture, facial expression, costume and props as well as speech, are identified by implication with reference to the texts of plays and four 'limbs' are found for each.

Coming back to the theory of composition, at the levels of sentence, word and phoneme (also the grammatical and lexical when separately distinguished) the critics have a great variety of instruments of analysis, including qualities of style and ornaments or figures of speech. These features also, when used by authors of genius, may all be significant in contributing to the total aesthetic effect of a *kāvya*.

Bhoja in particular has explored thoroughly the relationship between language and literature, whereby

literature seems to arise out of language by extension, by variation of the possibilities of combination of expression with meaning. He has elaborated this linguistic analysis further by working in the principles of interpretation of the Vedic Mīmāṃsā. One can see in all this a striving for the unification of theory. A concept which explains a wide range of phenomena would seem to be a powerful one and to go deep into the nature of language or expression, including art.

Whatever the enrichment of theory, the aim of criticism remains simply the enjoyment of literature. Though one may take pleasure in the successful development of a theory, and Bhoja himself claimed that his own illumination of many branches of learning was a *kāvya*, the point of a critic's work is that when applied to a particular piece of literature it facilitates our getting enjoyment from it. All the critics are agreed that the main function of literature is to give delight and that this delight comes essentially in the form of *rasa*.

Finally we may return to the general characterization of Indian literary criticism and the question whether it is a science. So far we seem to have found that it is a science, but we can now take the discussion a little further.

Indian literary criticism is in the main empiricist. There may be a few exceptions, but the critics we have referred to are all empiricists. As in the case of linguistics in India, the main tradition of criticism is based on the study of texts and describes what is found in them. Criticism attempts to ascertain why certain

kāvya-s are considered beautiful, how they affect an audience or a reader. The theories proposed are based on the facts of literature. They are established on the basis of quotations and references and an acceptable theory must be capable of explaining or describing whatever is generally accepted as beautiful. Thus we find the same works referred to and the same passages quoted by different critics, all of whom attempt to explain the beauty in terms of their own theories and thus to prove that their theories are general and have explanatory power. As the grammarians studied language in general, so the critics studied the special language of literature and offered descriptions of it, which could, in a broad sense, be called 'grammars' and which shared the characteristics of the Sanskrit grammars, namely of scientific description.

Literary criticism in India is an autonomous, independent science. It does not depend on religion or on any other extraneous authority. Incidentally it is thus also secular. The critics in fact held a variety of religious and philosophical opinions, which did not prevent them from contributing to the common field of criticism and developing each other's views on the basis of the principles of criticism itself. Bhāmaha was a Buddhist; his commentator Udbhaṭa appears from Jaina references to have been a Lokāyatika; Kuntaka who developed Bhāmaha's theory further was a Kāśmīra Śaiva. All this seems to have no bearing on their work as critics. Daṇḍin certainly favoured Brāhmanism and in his novel *Avantisundarī*, at least,

shows no sympathy at all with the ethical ideals of Buddhism. But the best commentator on his critical work *Kāvyalakṣaṇa* is the Buddhist Ratnaśrījñāna, and the work was translated by Buddhists into Tibetan and adapted by them in Pali in Ceylon. The fact that the greatest critics of Kaśmīra were Śaiva-s of the Pratyabhijñā school peculiar to that country was no obstacle to their appreciation outside. There is of course an exception to all this in the Vaiṣṇava devotional school of Rūpa Gosvāmin, but that is a secondary movement in recent times which does not affect the main tradition of criticism. The principles of literary criticism in the main tradition are derived from literature itself, from what authors do and what readers enjoy.

Indian criticism aims to set up general principles and definitions. These are always subject to improvement. This improvement represents a kind of progress in the science, such as is characteristic of all sciences. We see a cumulative process as successive critics add to the analysis and the theories. The theory of composition develops from Yāska through the *Nāṭyaśāstra* doctrine of the language of the theatre to Bhāmaha and on to Kuntaka and Bhoja. Similarly the theory of aesthetics develops from the *Nāṭyaśāstra* to Lollaṭa and others and reaches a culminating point in Abhinavagupta. These two departments of theory, having met in practice in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, were increasingly brought into organic relationship with each other, merging into a single theory with *rasa* as the basic principle underlying expression. Bhoja's entire work

is a grand synthesis of almost all previous criticism, combined with linguistics and the theory of interpretation (Mīmāṃsā) in a more general theory and propounded as an elaboration of Bhāmaha's simple definition of literature as beautiful expression and meaning combined. The beauty, according to Bhoja, is that *rasa* is never absent. Even this was not the end of the development and further progress was always possible, though recent centuries do not seem to have been as creative in this field as the times of the critics we have mentioned. The next step was to attempt a synthesis of Bhoja and Kuntaka, which was done by the author (unidentified as yet) of the *Sāhityamīmāṃsā*, 'Investigation of Composition'. He adopted Bhoja's twelve aspects of composition but preferred Kuntaka's method of eliminating apparently redundant elements from the mass of doctrines which had come down. Thus he reduced Kuntaka's set of figures of speech still further, from eighteen to ten, said to include all others except those which were not figures at all.

The study is objective, which follows from its being empiricist but has a further positive aspect. The aim is to be able to say that a particular piece of literature is objectively beautiful. 'Beautiful' may be taken as equivalent to producing aesthetic effect, producing *rasa.* This objectivity directly contradicts one view which is quite strong in Europe, namely that the appreciation of art and literature is essentially subjective, that nothing is objectively beautiful and that criticism consists only of what people say in

reaction to art, their purely subjective reactions. In the Indian tradition, on the other hand, literature which is *rasavant*, ‘having aesthetic experience’, is objectively found to produce such experience in readers or audiences. Though tastes do vary, there is enough common ground to establish that certain *kāvya-s* are beautiful, objectively. Criticism in India has been not just a matter of saying ‘I like this’ but of finding out why people enjoy something and what it is, objectively, that they enjoy.

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(the translations given are in all cases by the present author)

APPENDIX

पादताडितकम्

न प्राप्नुवन्ति यतयो रुदितेन मोक्षं
स्वर्गायतिं न परिहासकथा रुणद्धि ।
तस्मात्प्रतीतमनसा हसितव्यमेव
वृत्तिं बुधेन खलु कौरुकुचीं विहाय ।। ५ ।।

उत्तररामचरिते

द्वितीयोऽङ्कः ।

एते ते कुहरेषु गद्गदनदद्गोदावरीवारयो
मेघालम्बितमौलिनीलशिखराः क्षोणीभृतो दाक्षिणाः ।
अन्योन्यप्रतिघातसंकुलचलत्कल्लोलकोलाहलै-
रुत्तालास्त इमे गभीरपयसः पुण्याः सरित्संगमाः ।। ३० ।।

रामचरिते महाकाव्ये समुद्रलङ्घनोत्साहितहनूमत्स्तुतिवर्णनो नाम पञ्चदशः सर्गः ।

लाङ्गूलेन गभस्तिमान्वलयितः प्रोतः शशी मौलिना
जीमूता विधुताः सटाभिरुडवो दंष्ट्राभिरासादिताः ।
उत्तीर्णोऽम्बुनिधिर्दृशैव विशदैस्तेनाट्टहासोर्मिभिः
लङ्केशस्य विलङ्घितो दिशि दिशि क्रूरः प्रतापानलः ।।६४।।

कुट्टनीमतं काव्यम् ।

अविदग्धः श्रमकठिनो दुर्लभयोषिद्युवा जडो विप्रः ।
अपमृत्युरुपक्रान्तः कामिव्याजेन मे रात्रौ ।। ३९२ ।।

शृणु सखि कौतुकमेकं ग्रामीणककामिना यदद्य कृतम् ।।
सुरतरसमीलिताक्षी मृतेति भीतेन मुक्तास्मि ।। ३९८ ।।

मालतीमाधवे

पञ्चमोऽङ्कः ।

राहोश्चन्द्रकलामिवाननचरीं दैवात्समासाद्य मे
दस्योरस्य कृपाणपातविषयादाच्छिन्दतः प्रेयसीम् ।
आतङ्काद्विकलं द्रुतं करुणया विक्षोभितं विस्मयात्
क्रोधेन ज्वलितं मुदा विकसितं चेतः कथं वर्तताम् ।।२८।।

हर्षचरिते

वृत्तेऽस्मिन् महाप्रलये धरणीधारणायाधुना त्वं शेषः ।

ततो रटत्पटहे, नदन्नान्दीके, गुञ्जद्गुञ्जे, क्रोशत्काहले, शब्दायमानशङ्खे, क्रमेणोपचीयमानकटककलकले, परिजनोचितव्यापृतव्यग्रसमग्रगृहव्यवहारिणि, द्रुतद्रुघणघातघटचमानकोणिकाकीलकोलाहलकलितककुभि, बलाधिकृतबोध्यमानपाटिकपेटके, जनज्वलितोल्कासहस्रालोकलुप्यमानत्रियामातमसि, यामचेटीचरणचालनोत्थाप्यमानकामिमिथुनके, कटुकटुकनिदेशनश्यन्निद्रोन्मिषन्निषादिनि, ... गृहचिन्तकपेटकसंवेष्टयमानपटकुटीकाण्डपटपटमण्डपपरिवस्त्रपटवितानके, कीलकलापपूर्यमाणचिपिटचर्मपुटे, सम्भाण्डयमानभाण्डागारिणि, भाण्डागारवहनवाह्यमानबहुबलिवाहके, निषादिनिश्चलानेकानेकपारोप्यमाणकोशकलशपेडापीडसङ्कटायमानसामन्तौकसि, दूरगतदक्षदासेरकक्षिप्यमाणोपकरणसंभारभारीक्रियमाणदुष्टदन्तिनि, ... चलितमातङ्गतुरङ्गप्रधावितप्राकृतप्रातिवेश्यलोकलुण्ठ्यमाननिर्घाससस्यसंचये, संचलत्तैलचक्राक्रान्त-

चक्रीवति, चक्रचीत्कारमुखरगन्त्रीगणगृह्यमाणप्रहतवर्त्मनि, अकाण्डोड्डीयमानभाण्डभरितानडुहि, निकटघासलाभलुभ्यल्लम्बनप्रथमप्रसार्यमाणसारसौरभेये, प्रमुखप्रवर्तमानमहासामन्तमहानसे, पुरप्रधावध्वजवाहिनीप्रियशतोल्लापलभ्यमानसङ्कटकुटीरान्तरालनिःसरणे, करिचरणचलितमठकोत्थितलोकलोष्टाहन्यमानमेण्ठक्रियमाणासन्नसाक्षिणि, सङ्घट्टविघट्टमानव्यालपल्लीपलायमानक्षुद्रकुटुम्बके, कलकलोपद्रवद्रवद्द्रविणबलीवर्दविद्राणवणिजि, ... रजोजग्धजगति, प्रयाणसमये . . . . .

भेषजसामग्रीसंपादनव्यग्रगृहव्यवहारिणि, मुहुर्मुहुराहूयमानतोयकर्मान्तिकानुमितघोरातुरतृषि, तुषारपरिकरितकर्करीशिशिरीक्रियमाणोदश्विति, श्वेतार्द्रकर्पटार्पितकर्पूरपरागशीतलीकृतशलाके, अनाश्यानपङ्कलिप्यमाननवभाण्डगतगण्डूषमस्तुनि, तिम्यत्कोमलकमलिनीपत्रप्रावृतमृदुमृणालके सनालनीलोत्पलपूलीसनाथसलिलपानभाजनभुवि, धारानिपातनिर्वाप्यमाणक्वथिताम्भसि, पटुपाटलशर्करामोदमुचि, मञ्चिकाश्रितसिकतिलकर्करीविश्रान्तातुरचक्षुषि, ...

निर्मोकमुक्तिमिव गगनोरगस्य

यत्र च मातङ्गगामिन्यः शीलवत्यश्च, गौर्यो विभवरताश्च, श्यामाः पद्मरागिण्यश्च, धवलद्विजशुचिवदना मदिरामोदनिःश्वसनाश्च, ...

समवाय इव विरोधिनां पदार्थानाम् । तथाहि—सन्निहितबालान्धकारा भास्वन्मूर्तिश्च, ...

कुसुमसमययुगम् उपसंहरन्नजृम्भत ग्रीष्माभिधानः फुल्लमल्लिका-धवलाट्टहासो महाकालः . . . . .

तत् कथय आगमनेनापुण्यभाक् कतमो देशो विजृम्भितविरहव्यथः शून्यतां नीतः । क्व वा गन्तव्यम् । को वायमपहृतहरहुंकाराहंकारोऽपर इवानन्यजो युवा । किन्नाम्नो वा समृद्धतपसः पितुरयम् अमृतवर्षी कौस्तुभ-मणिरिव हरेर्हृदयमाह्लादयति । का वास्य त्रिभुवननमस्या प्रभातसन्ध्येव महतस्तेजसो जननी । कानि वास्य पुण्यभाञ्जि भजन्त्यभिख्यामक्षराणि ।

उत्तररामचरिते

प्रथमोऽङ्कः ।

इयं गेहे लक्ष्मीरियममृतवर्तिर्नयनयो-
रसावस्याः स्पर्शो वपुषि बहुलश्चन्दनरसः ।
अयं बाहुः कण्ठे शिशिरमसृणो मौक्तिकसरः
किमस्या न प्रेयो यदि परमसह्यस्तु विरहः ।। ३८ ।।

द्वितीयोऽङ्कः ।

वज्रादपि कठोराणि मृदूनि कुसुमादपि ।
लोकोत्तराणां चेतांसि को हि विज्ञातुमर्हति ।। ७ ।।

तृतीयोऽङ्कः ।

त्वं जीवितं त्वमसि मे हृदयं द्वितीयं
त्वं कौमुदी नयनयोरमृतं त्वमङ्गे ।
इत्यादिभिः प्रियशतैरनुरुध्य मुग्धां
तामेव शान्तमथवा किमिहोत्तरेण ।। २६ ।।

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